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1 Introduction
This paper will expand on Tollefsen’s insights into the New Natural Law (NNL) 
theory as presented in his paper in the present volume.1 NLL theorists are commit‑
ted to the view that basic goods are grasped by reason in opposition to a perspective 
that engages with human nature. As Tollefsen points out, “The ‘New’ view is unlike 
at least some older views that take human nature, or a metaphysics of human nature, 
to be prior to and necessary for the derivation of moral norms.”2 Thus for the old 
natural law theorist, moral or ethical normativity is derivative of natural normativ‑
ity; by contrast, as explained by Tollefsen, the new natural law theorist distinguishes 
between theoretical and practical reason, and this is to my mind the key distinc‑
tion between old and new natural law theorists. For the NNL theorist, the practical 
order is irreducible to the theoretical/metaphysical order and the latter explanation 
of action is parasitic on the practical order when we act.
Tollefsen’s strategy in “Aquinas’s Four Orders, Normativity, and Human Nature” 
is to defend NNL theorists by showing that the goods realized in practical reason 
are manifested in that order and not in the order of nature. In other words, it is only 
because the good is intelligible to us, i.e. we can access the good through our reason, 
that we can engage with it. For Tollefsen this is not a purely epistemic point; it is 
not simply that we know the good through our intellect but that the manifestation 
and realization of the good is according to how we understand what the good is in 
action.
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In this way, practical reason and the realization of the good is primarily forward‑
looking as opposed to theoretical, epistemic or metaphysical approaches which are 
backward‑looking ways of understanding action, i.e. actions in terms of motivations 
or the pair beliefs/desires that explain the action.3
According to Tollefsen two important arguments have been advanced by NNL 
theorists: a) we cannot infer the good from regularities unless we already know the 
good, therefore no empirical observation of natural teleology will either help us or 
be sufficient to understand the complexity of what is good; and b) human goods are 
plural, complex, incommensurable and open‑ended. It would seem that b) is a corol‑
lary of a) and therefore we need to understand how practical engagement with the 
good explains a). The works of Grisez, Finnis, Anscombe, Tollefsen and my own 
work have engaged with explaining what practical reason is in relation to the good 
that is caused and brought about through deliberation and choice. In this paper, I 
will expand on Tollefsen’s point concerning the practical reason‑focused perspective 
of the NNL theory and the rejection of the idea that metaphysical/theoretical rea‑
son is prior to practical reason by unpacking the underlying meta‑ethics of Elizabeth 
Anscombe in relation to evaluative facts.
I will argue that for Anscombe 1) evaluative facts and natural facts are not sepa‑
rated and 2) when we act and therefore take the practical, first‑person or delibera‑
tive perspective, we look neither at the natural nor evaluative facts that constitute 
the background of our actions and social practices. These two insights are key to 
reinforcing the point that the practical domain is separate from the metaphysical/
theoretical domain of action and social practices when we act.
2  Anscombe’s Institutional Transparency Thesis and the Unity 
of Intelligibility
When we act, this is not merely a physical movement or some mental state of a 
human actor. We experience these phenomena of the physical world in form of a 
unity that results from the inner dimension of these actions. Or, as we might put it 
more precisely: this unity results from the agent‘s choice and intention. The choice 
that expresses itself in the physical realm in certain movements makes it a certain 
kind of action or constitutes its nature or species.4
If this is the case, then, the question becomes how this inner dimension, which 
gives form to human action, can be intelligible to third persons. For example, when 
I see someone sitting at a desk and tracing lines on a sheet of paper with certain fea‑
tures, I understand that she is writing a letter if and only if I grasp what she intends 
4 In what follows, I develop an arguemt which I had outlined (with Pilar Zambrano) in “One Myth of the 
Classical Law Theory: Reflecting on the ’Thin’ View of Legal Positivism,” Ratio Juris 31 (2018): 9–32.
3 See my book Veronica Rodriguez Blanco, Law and Authority under the Guise of the Good (Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2014), chapters 1 and 4. Tollefsen puts this point as follows: “A fur‑
ther consideration is that all truths in the practical domain are true in relation to what is not yet” (Tollef‑
sen, Op. cit., p. 12, original manuscript).
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to do. This inner dimension is intelligible because the logos of intentional actions—
in other words, the reasons behind the actions—can be understood through the spe‑
cific social context in which the exterior performance occurs. I understand her inten‑
tions, in the example, since I recognize objects with the typical features of stationary 
and envelops on the desk of the agent and since I know what is required by the 
practice of writing letters.
Anscombe discusses this relationship between the exterior performance of actions 
and the institutional facts or social contexts in which they occur in her 1958 article 
“On Brute Facts.”5 In what I have termed her institutional transparency thesis, Ans‑
combe argues that while a factual description of an action “A” is not a description of 
the institution behind “A,”6 the existence of a factual description of action “A” does 
presuppose an institution A. Put in the context of intelligibility, to understand the 
inner dimension (i.e., intention, choice) of a third person’s actions requires under‑
standing the social or institutional context in which those actions occur. To under‑
stand that the utterance of certain words by someone is a promise, for example, I 
need to know how promises are institutionalized in my community, even if – and 
this is the transparency thesis – I do not need to think about that while I promise or 
when I recognize a promise. Furthermore, the intelligibility of these actions occurs 
not at the level of the theoretical but at the level of the practical.
To explain further, we must ask what the institution behind the description is. 
Anscombe offers an example, “I Owe the Grocer Five Pounds for the Potatoes that 
the Grocer Has Supplies to Me”, that we can use as a starting point.
Let us say that I order a kilogram of potatoes from the grocer, the grocer loads the 
potatoes into his delivery van, the grocer rings my doorbell, he unloads the potatoes 
from his delivery van, and he gives me a bill for five pounds.
You are present at my house during this time and so you observe both my 
actions and the grocer’s actions. You conclude, as an observer, “I owe the grocer 
five pounds.” You reach this conclusion, but how? Do you reach this conclusion 
because you ask me what am I doing and I tell you? But you would only ask this 
question when what I am doing is unintelligible to you. You understand both the 
way I move my body and the reasons why I am moving my body as a unity. Unless 
you already possess the concepts necessary to understand the reasons why I move 
my body—concepts such as supplying, owing, and five pounds —simply observing 
the way the grocer and I move our bodies as I receive the potatoes and the bill for 
five pounds does not tell you that “I owe the grocer five pounds for the potatoes 
he has supplied.” You only understand the obligation of owing, the obligation only 
becomes intelligible to you, if you already understand the action of supplying as the 
reason for the obligation of owing. In that case, you already grasped concepts such 
as supplying, owing, and five pounds prior to the bodily movements between the 
grocer and me. You, the grocer, and myself had previously learned that set of con‑
cepts within the context of the social institution of buying and selling. We learned 
that set of concepts when we were young and learned that the exchange of goods 
5 Elizabeth Anscombe, “Brute Facts”, Analysis 18 (1958): 69–72.
6 Ibid., p. 72.
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in our society creates obligations. We learned as a unity the bodily movements and 
the reasons why we buy, sell, and satisfy our obligations in the exchange of goods. 
My bodily movements, the bodily movements of the grocer, and the reasons why 
we perform those actions, in other words the logos of those actions, are understood 
as a whole in Anscombe’s example. Your grasp, as an observer, of the unity of the 
bodily movements and reasons why those bodily movements were performed does 
not describe the institution of buying and selling. Rather, this background institution 
provides you with the basis by which you determine the intentions behind the bodily 
movements that stamp a logos in those bodily movements.
Because the action is practical, it should be understood as practical. We can say 
that the action is practical because it is about the intentions of the grocer and the 
buyer. The grocer and buyer intend to produce a certain state of affairs and they 
know why they are doing what they are doing. The grocer knows why he loads a 
kilogram of potatoes into his delivery van, why he rings the doorbell, and why he 
unloads the potatoes at the buyer’s house. As the buyer, I know why I am order‑
ing the kilogram of potatoes, why I am receiving them from the grocer, and why I 
am receiving the bill for five pounds. Additionally, we both know what the other is 
doing and why they are doing it because we both understand the background institu‑
tion of buying and selling that allows us to make our bodily movements intelligible.
Would, Anscombe asks, the same bodily movements in a film where one actor 
supplies the potatoes and another actor receives the potatoes be different from the 
example above? 7 In the example above, as the buyer, I owe the grocer five pounds, 
whereas in the film we would not say that the actor playing the buyer owes the 
actor playing the grocer five pounds because the intention of the agents is different. 
Despite the actors’ bodily movements in the film, they do not intend to create a pur‑
chasing contract or the obligation to satisfy such a contract. When the grocer hands 
me the bill in the example in which I am the buyer, the grocer and I do intend to 
create such a contract; therefore, I understand that I owe the grocer five pounds. And 
the observer, who understands the difference between the background institutions in 
each situation, understands the difference between those two situations.
3  The Intelligibility of Intentional Action: One Action with Two 
Perspectives
To further understand this subtle and difficult point we need to understand Ans‑
combe’s conception of intentional action which rejects actions as a two‑link causal‑
effect chain composed of an interior act, i.e. mental states such as beliefs and desires 
that cause an action, and the exterior action that is the effect of the interior act. Like 
Aquinas, Anscombe does not separate the physical action and the answer to the 
question why the agent is acting in the way he or she is acting. If the question why 
cannot be applied to the physical action, then more than likely the action was not 
intentional. Which is to say that there are not two actions, an interior and an exterior, 
7 Ibid., p. 70.
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but only one action. Different perspectives can analyze that action, but the exterior 
action is one and the same as, and not essentially different from, the interior will. 
The one action is its performance and manifestation.8
What, then, is the choice or will that is performed and manifested by the exterior 
action? To answer, we must determine whether or not a distinction exists between 
the intention to act, in which case my will is operant and involved in the action, 
and a voluntary action. Of course, actions can be voluntary; for example, talking, 
walking, jumping, etc. are voluntary actions. Actions can also be involuntary; for 
example, my lungs’ respiratory functions, my stomach moving, etc. are involuntary 
actions. But for voluntary actions specifically, do all voluntary actions involve the 
will? Put more concretely, do all voluntary actions involve a choice?9
Consider two different examples. In one, I move my arm but instead of my arm 
moving my foot moves. In another, I move my arm and my arm in fact moves. My 
actions are voluntary in both examples; however, my action does not perform my 
choice in the first example. My choice is to move my arm, and in this first example 
my choice is not satisfied. If you were observing me in these two instances, you 
would observe my foot move and then you would observe my arm move. How would 
you be able to determine whether or not my choice was satisfied in each instance? 
We can make a distinction, then, between a merely volitional act, i.e. an act initi‑
ated by a person, and a willful act, i.e. a volitional act that actually performs their 
choice. That said, how could third‑person observers know whether the act is voli‑
tional or willful? Observers could see that I move my foot and arm, but they cannot 
know my choice so they cannot, from observation alone, know that my arm moved 
intentionally.
Arguably, the way to determine whether or not an action is willed is to ask the 
agent to describe the action. For example, we see John moving his hand and hitting 
Mark, and we ask John whether his motion – which was clearly volitional – was 
intended to hit Mark or whether the hitting was accidental. But, even if the agent’s 
description is the best way of determining whether or not the action is willed, agents 
are only very rarely asked to describe their actions because, in most cases, the insti‑
tutional background in combination with the physical movements of the action are 
sufficient to make such a determination. If John hits Mark while they are standing on 
a ring in shorts and wearing boxing gloves, we know that the hitting was intended. 
The agent’s description of her choices may even become irrelevant, as in the context 
of the law, where the institutional background that makes these choices intelligible.
8 See Aquinas, Suma Theologiae I‑II, qq. 17–20, especially q. 17, a. 4; qq. 18 a.6 and q. 20.
9 See Ibid., I‑II, q. 18, particularly, aa. 2 and 7; John Finnis, Moral Absolutes. Tradition, Revision and 
Truth (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1988), pp. 65–66; and Martin Rhon‑
heimer, Perspective of the Acting Person: Essays in the Renewal of Thomistic Moral Philosophy (Wash‑
ington D.C: Catholic University of America Press, 2008), p. 41.
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4  Davidson and Hume
A theoretical engagement with human action is closer to an explanation than to a 
form of understanding. In theoretical or metaphysical knowledge, actions are indi‑
viduated through a cognitive process that focuses not on identifying choices per‑
formed in actions but on identifying actions as effects of previous events. Donald 
Davidson, in his account of intentional action, defends this causal theory of action 
and the correlative theory of the interpretation of concrete actions.10
Many scholars have assumed that Davidson and Anscombe hold similar views 
regarding intentional action because Davidson uses some of Anscombe’s ideas and 
because of the difficultness of Anscombe’s work, which does not rely on a general 
theory or system.11 However, Anscombe’s and Davidson’s accounts of intentional 
action and of the interpretation of action are, in fact, fundamentally different.
For Davidson, intentional actions are understood in terms of the reasons that 
the agent gives when describing what the agent did. The goal is to rationalize the 
action. Furthermore, the agent can be said to have a reason if a) the agent has a pro‑
attitude toward the action and b) the agent believes (or knows, remembers, notices, 
perceives) that his action is of that kind.12 Davidson calls this pairing of belief and 
desire a primary reason and he claims that “a primary reason for an action is its 
cause.”13
In Davidson’s account, beliefs and desires are mental events that (may) cause an 
exterior action, which is a subsequent and corresponding event. The relationship 
between mental events and actions is causal, specifically a kind of causal relation‑
ship between facts.14 So, my desire to flip a switch and my belief that my action 
is of that kind causes the action I flip the switch. Furthermore, observation of the 
action allows us to induce the cause. Even though we only observe the effect, i.e. 
the action, which in this case is the flipping of the switch, we can induce the cause, 
i.e. the mental events that caused the effect. This cognitive process, which allows us 
to individuate the nature of various actions, is not fundamentally different from the 
cognitive process which explains physical events.
Davidson denies that there are psychophysical laws that connect actions and 
reasons, saying that if there are laws they ought to be neurological, chemical or 
physical.15 In the last forty years, his account of intentional action has exerted great 
influence. In that time, practical reasoning has tended to be assimilated into inten‑
tional action as a mental state.16 The assimilation of practical reasoning as a men‑
tal state offers two advantages over competing accounts like Anscombe’s. One, this 
15 Ibid.
16 See, for example, Jay Wallace, "Practical Reason," Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (http://plato 
.stanf ord.edu/): ”Practical reasoning gives rise not to bodily movements per se, but to intentional actions, 
and these are intelligible as such only to the extent they reflect our mental states.”
10 Donals Davidson, “Actions, Reasons and Causes,” Journal of Philosophy 60 (1963): 685–700.
11 See Julia Annas, “Davidson and Anscombe on the ‘same action’”, Mind 85 (1976); 251–257.
12 Davidson, op. cit., p. 685.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
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assimilation allows neo‑Humeans17 to advance the Humean view that desires or pro‑
attitudes motivate and explain intentional actions. Two, this assimilation is compat‑
ible with a descriptive, scientifically‑neutral understanding of action as caused by 
mental events. Despite these advantages, Davidson’s view contains a notable flaw; 
namely, it has no way to guarantee that the causal link between a reason and the cor‑
responding action is right.18
There are other problems that affect the standard model of intentional action. If 
an intention to act is a mental state it entails that I can remember my mental state; 
that I can reflect on it, but it seems that the memory of or reflection on my intention 
as a mental state vanish. If intentions are purely mental states they can vanish, we 
might not remember them correctly, they might not endure, and then our intentional 
action might also vanish.
In conclusion, putting human actions on the same level as the physical / theoreti‑
cal or metaphysical events, or putting the understanding human actions on the same 
level as the explanation of causal relationships, fails to guarantee the individuation 
of actions.
As previously discussed, the best way to determine if an agent willed an action 
is to ask the agent him or herself for a description of the action. We can prompt a 
description of the action by asking the agent why he or she performed an action.19 
Prompting a description in this way is known as the why-question methodology and 
is the key method in Anscombe’s Intention for clarifying the connections between 
the action and (our) practical reasoning.20 Fully understanding this methodology 
requires accounting for several considerations:
a) paradigmatically, an intentional action is a sequence of actions with aim toward 
the action’s final end.
b) we know that the explanation finishes because the last step is described in terms 
of good‑making characteristics that make intelligible and illuminate as a coherent 
whole the successive steps of the action.
17 See Gilbert Harman, Change in View (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1986); Gilbert Harman, ‘Will‑
ing and Intending,’ in R. Grandy and R. Warner, eds., Philosophical Grounds of Rationality (New York: 
OUP, 1986); Simon Blackburn, Ruling Passions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998); Michael Smith, The 
Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).
18 Roderick Chisholm was the first scholar to write about deviant causal chins in R. Chisholm, “Free‑
dom and Action,” in K. Lehrer, ed., Freedom and Determinism (New York: Random House, 1976), p. 
28. Other, more radical scholars go further and deny that intentional actions are causes, see for example, 
Jonathan Dancy, Practical Reality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
19 Moran and Stone offer the following explanation for the why‑question methodology: “Hence all psy‑
chic forms are performance modifiers: insofar as they are employable in action‑explaining answers to the 
question ‘why?’, they express forms of being on‑the‑way‑to‑but‑not‑yet having Φ‑ed, of already stretch‑
ing oneself toward this end”. See R. Moran, and M. Stone, “Anscombe on Expression of Intention,” in 
C. Sandis, ed., New Essays in the Explanation of Action (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), p. 148.
20 Anscombe’s exposition follows Aquinas’s explanation of intentional action very closely. Notably, 
Anthony Kenny, Aristotle’s Theory of the Will (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979) argues that 
Aquinas’ model would be better understood more as a Gestalt psychology.
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c) we have only one action, not different actions, and that one action is unified by 
the action’s final end as a reason for the action, understood with regard to good‑
making characteristics.
d) the reason must be a reason that might be genuinely offered to others as a justi‑
fication, and this reason must also be the same as the reason that the agent gives 
to him or herself.
With these considerations in mind, we can now explain the why‑question 
methodology.
Anscombe begins Intention by stating that the subject of the book should be stud‑
ied under three headings: expression of an intention; intentional action; and inten‑
tion in acting,21 and that all these should be understood as interdependent. Thus, an 
expression of an intention cannot be understood as a prediction about my future acts 
nor as an introspective explanation of an intention such as desires, wants, etc. If I 
utter “this afternoon I will go for a walk” as an expression of an intention, the utter‑
ance cannot be understood as a forecast. Indeed, the intention is rightly expressed 
by the utterance, even if then it turns out that as a forecast it would have been false, 
since a friend comes to visit and I cannot leave home. The utterance cannot either 
be an expression of desires or wants. I might intend to walk even if I have no desire 
whatsoever to do it: for example, I might have to go to my friends and give him back 
the book he lend me, even if I would rather do something else. Anscombe tells us, 
however, that people formulate expressions of intentions that are about the future 
and that they turn out to be correct.22 How is this possible?
In order to answer this question, she tries to explain the way in which we can 
identify intentional acts and separate them from non‑intentional actions. To do so 
requires taking the logical step of trying to understand what it means when I say that 
I have acted with an intention. For Anscombe, acting intentionally means acting for 
a reason or being able to provide reasons for actions, with the understanding that the 
question why can be said to apply to such actions.23 All of which is to say that we 
act intentionally when we act for reasons, which in turn entails us to be responsive 
and sensitive to a framework of justification for our actions. If I perform an action 
Φ; am asked why; and give a genuine answer, for example, “I was not aware I was 
doing Φ” or “I did not know I was performing Φ,” the action cannot be said to be 
intentional or directed by reasons. The action might be voluntary, but it is not inten‑
tional.24 On the other hand, if the answer takes one of these forms: “because Φ” or 
“in order to Φ,” then it might be a prima facie case for an intentional action, which 
is to say an action directed by reasons. Reasons demonstrate themselves, so to speak, 
in intentional actions, and reasons demonstrate that they operate as a part of the 
practical reasoning of an agent.
21 Moran and Stone explain the transformation of these three headings in the post‑Intention literature, 
see op. cit., p. 137.
22 Elizabeth Anscombe, Intention (Oxford: Blackwell, 1957; 2nd Edition, 1963), paragraphs 3–4.
23 Ibid., paragraphs 4–6.
24 Ibid., paragraph 17.
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The problem for the understanding of action is whether or not, when asked why 
we performed that action, we can exert control over the truthfulness of the response 
we give in answer. A further problem presents itself: whether or not we can give a 
plausible answer without reliance on the testimony of the agent of the action.
Anscombe notes that a set of contextual conditions allow us to determine whether 
or not the agent has given his or her genuine intentions in response to the question 
why.25 This set of contextual conditions are those concepts learned at a young age 
through social context. For example, we learn that money is necessary to purchase 
goods and that if we order goods for home delivery then we owe the seller money. 
Given our example of a scene in a film in which a grocer delivers potatoes, we know 
from the contextual conditions that when the actor‑buyer says that he owes the actor‑
grocer five pounds, the actor‑buyer’s words are not genuine. Or given the example 
from Anscombe’s Intention, if a person poisons a river with toxic waste and we ask 
“why?”, and the person answers “I am just doing my job,” then we can determine 
whether or not this action is in fact a part of his job and whether or not the contex‑
tual conditions make it true, and, if not, then we have a reason to suspect that his 
response is not genuine.
Intentional actors, or actions performed for reasons, require a sequence of steps 
or actions and, therefore, a sequence of reasons that explain each action‑step. If one 
writes a letter and has a reason to do it (e.g., greet a friend), she writes it by taking 
a sheet of paper and a pen and by tracing signs with the pen on the paper. Writing 
the letter is her reason to trace lines on the sheet and scribbling on the sheet is her 
reason for taking the sheet from the drawer. This being the case, the question arises, 
then, of how we can know when the explanation is complete and the agent can stop. 
Anscombe argues that the justification stops when the agent describes the endpoint 
of the action with regard to what is desirable or good for itself. The endpoint of the 
action is, then, a state of affairs, a fact, an object, or an event that the agent appears 
to consider desirable or good. The state of affairs, fact, object, or event is consid‑
ered by the agent to be a good sort of thing. This explanation is commonsensical 
and arguably the most naive explanation of our actions.26 For example, when the 
potatoes are delivered to my house, the grocer does not say he is delivering them 
because he is in the mental state of desiring to deliver potatoes and has the mental 
state of believing and remembering that this is that kind of action. On the contrary, 
in order to deliver the potatoes the grocer loads the potatoes into his delivery van, 
drives to my house, parks the van in front of my house, exits his van, unloads the 
potatoes from the van, rings my doorbell, and takes the potatoes to my kitchen. The 
sequence of action steps obtain intelligibility and unity in the good‑making reason 
that, for instance, the grocer sells potatoes that he buys from farmers, that he wants 
to earn money, etc.
Let us recall the difference with the actors in the film scene buying and sell-
ing potatoes. From the point of view of the agents it was their intention to attain a 
26 See Germain Grisez, “The First Principles of Practical Reasons: A Commentary on the Suma Theolo-
giae, 1–2, Question 94, Article 2,” Natural Law Forum 10 (1967), p. 177.
25 Ibid., paragraph 25.
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specific good that makes the distinction between the actions of the actors in the film 
and the actions of the grocer who delivered the potatoes to my home. In the film 
scene buying and selling potatoes, the actors do not intend to buy and sell potatoes, 
therefore we cannot say that the actor‑buyer owes five pounds to the actor‑grocer.
To return to our initial discussion, how can the intention/choice of the agent 
become intelligible to an observer and allow the observer to individuate that inten‑
tion/choice? Intelligibility requires i) that both the agent and observer hold a mutual 
understanding of what good‑making characteristics may be intended or chosen 
by the agent in performing an action, and ii) that the good‑making characteristics 
intended by the agent are manifest in the action. The first condition requires that 
the good making characteristics do not exist by pure convention or exist just given 
in nature, but are, at least to some extent, objects of human intelligence. Were the 
good‑making characteristics not objects of human intelligence, the agent would not 
even be able to name them. The second condition requires that the intended good‑
making characteristics of an action be a specific instance of the good‑making char‑
acteristics of the institutional background or social practices that give actions their 
final form or logos.27
These conditions in mind, the primary aim of the why‑question methodology is 
to highlight the articulation or structure of an intentional action.28 In our potatoes 
example, the grocer does not think and reflect on why he is doing what he is doing at 
each concrete action step. Rather, the grocer understood the sequence of action steps 
necessary for buying and selling and the good‑making characteristics that explain 
why we human beings buy and sell in the social context.
The concern, then, is not to discover the propositional attitudes—the desires 
and beliefs that explain the buying and selling—nor even to explicitly describe the 
institution of buying and selling, nor to discover the nature of the human action in 
terms of a given good. The concern is to understand whether or not the action is 
intentional and to understand what choice the agent intends in the performance of 
the action. Putting the testimony of the agent aside for the moment, it is only pos‑
sible to understand the agent’s choice when his action is understood as a specific 
instance within a social practice and justified by the good‑making characteristics of 
that social practice. Only once those understandings are in place can the observer 
grasp the intentional action as a unity of physical movements and the answer to the 
question why, or the grounding logos of the action.
27 See Ibid., 174. These arguments are further developed in P. Zambrano, "Fundamental Principles, 
Realist Semantics and Human Action," Recthstheorie, 46 (2015), pp. 330 ss.
28 Candace Vogler, C. “Anscombe on Practical Inference,” in E. Millgram, ed., Varieties of Practical 
Reasoning (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT University Press, 2001).
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5  Conclusion
Tollefsen has said that, “traditional Thomists and some contemporary natural‑
ists treat morality as a matter of the first order: morality’s norms are to be found in 
natural norms. Why, they might ask, is that an error?”29 Tollefsen argues that just 
because something has natural good characteristics, it does not necessarily have a 
motivational grip on us and, worse, does not reflect the complexity, plurality, incom‑
mensurability and open‑ended features of human goods as opposed to the good of 
natural kinds (like oak trees). I, however, tackle the question of whether the practical 
domain is prior to theoretical knowledge in action in a different way.
If Anscombe is correct about the importance of institutional facts and in saying 
they are inevitably transparent to us, then we learn the logos or order of reasons 
in action implicit in the practical domain with other human beings, in our inter‑
actions with other human beings and in our social and institutional practices. We 
also acquire complex, incommensurable, plural and open‑ended human goods. This 
knowledge is practical because it is directed to action. It is flawed, as Tollefsen and 
NNL theorists have emphasized, to say that the good first requires theoretical reflec‑
tion and/or knowledge about nature and/or human nature, and thereafter practical 
grip mysteriously emerges. These accounts leave unexplained how volition, motiva‑
tion or will are added to our theoretical knowledge or knowledge of human nature. 
Rather knowledge of the good is practical all the way through, for instance, when 
we learn words like “owe,” “promise” or “obligation,” and these words and actions 
entail and partially depend on theoretical knowledge, e.g. when I promise to make 
you a cup of tea and know that I have to heat the water to the boiling point but that, 
if I am not careful, the boiling water will scald me. But this knowledge about nature 
and human nature is learned towards action and therefore towards ends that will be 
realized in the practical domain. When I am acting, I am not in the contemplative or 
theoretical mode, connecting my ideas, beliefs and representations about the world 
with reality. On the contrary, I am engaging in transforming the world and bringing 
about something through my actions from making a cup of tea, to writing musical 
pieces or novels, to buying potatoes.
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